Adrie Anthonie Alexander Prosman
This study attempts to answer the question of how theology has responded to Nietzsche’s nihilism. This question is linked with other questions. What is the connection between Nietzsche’s nihilism and the death of God? Why is God’s death so important to Nietzsche? About the death of which God is he speaking and which conclusions can be drawn from this with reference to theology?
The first part of the study (Nietzsche and nihilism; Chapters 2 to 5) consists of a description of the meaning of nihilism in Nietzsche’s thinking. An attempt is made to clarify this notion and to indicate how nihilism is present in the whole of Nietzsche’s range of thought. Subsequently, the way that philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche has dealt with the notion of nihilism is described.
The second part (Theology and Nietzsche; Chapters 7 to 11) examines the reception that the discipline of theology has given to Nietzsche’s nihilism. The choice of theologians has been determined by whether they have been mainly concerned with Nietzsche or not. Of course Nietzsche’s influence extends to a much wider range of theologians than those who explicitly discuss his work, but the aim is to give an indication of the way in which Nietzsche’s thoughts on nihilism and God’s death have been judged by a number of eminent theologians.
The third part (Nietzsche and the Christian faith; Chapters 13 and 14) tries to initiate a systematic reflection on the situation in which Nietzsche has placed the Church and theology. I am guided in this reflection by the extent to which the assessed theologians have a correct understanding of Nietzsche’s nihilism and whether the meaning of God’s death has actually been recognized by them or not. Chapters 2 through 5 give a precise description of the notion of nihilism, and the difference between the death of God and the murder of God. By means of a close-reading of Nietzsche’s works (Chapter 3) we get a better insight into Nietzsche’s philosophy.
Biser has been the first and, so far, the only author to explicitly direct himself against Nietzsche’s proclamation of God’s death (Chapter 4). Biser is of the opinion that Nietzsche regards God as an explanatory principle. He argues that the subject of dismantlement (Destruktion) is not God nor the existence of God, but the concept of God: God as the authority which holds together reality and provides a sense of purpose. He then states that Christian theology had taken leave of this incorrect notion of God a long time ago.
However, it appears from my rendition and interpretation of Nietzsche’s writings (Chapter 3) that Nietzsche not only rejects the philosophical notion of God, but also in particular God as Redeemer. Against this, Nietzsche places his own interpretation of Jesus, one that is acceptable to him. He sees Jesus as someone living beyond good and evil, someone whom evil no longer has a hold over. Nietzsche deliberately deviates from the image that the New Testament gives of Jesus. Nietzsche is not really orientated around the figure of Jesus. The development of his religious thoughts stems from the Dionysian feel of life. His notion of God is not a philosophical notion of God, nor a Greek notion of God, but a Dionysian notion of God.
Vattimo emphasizes that the distinction Nietzsche draws between the Dionysian component of reality and the Apollonian is of vital importance (Chapter 2). This distinction, this difference is of such vital importance that history is determined by it. The difference does not belong to the past, it is not a part of history, but history itself commences with it. If this difference precedes history, it also precedes culture and thereby provides us with the key to understanding what culture is. It is no coincidence or incidental circumstance that Nietzsche brings up this difference in connection with the mythological figures of Dionysus and Apollo. And by that, he shows that the source of the difference lies outside the historical process.
Nietzsche’s thoughts about God are of great importance if we want to get to the core of his concept of culture. This is made clear following René Girard and F. de Graaff (Chapter 5). The death of God is actually the murder of God. Faith in the God of the Bible interferes with the emancipation of humankind and the development of culture. Therefore, God’s death is imperative. In the killing of God, Girard sees the workings of a general principle, the mechanism of victimisation, by which the solidarity of society is restored and culture is made possible by the killing of a guilty victim. Violence is the foundation of culture. This becomes particularly clear in Nietzsche’s desire for power. Girard exposes the desire for power as a mechanism which legitimizes the killing of the victim for the sake of society and culture. De Graaff’s analysis has similarities with Girard’s, but a completely different outcome. The big difference is that, according to Girard, violence is the basis of Nietzsche’s view of culture, whereas, according to De Graaff the basis is not violence, but the sacred.
In De Graaff’s line of thought everything revolves around the death of the God of the West. Some part of this God, the form of an angel, was present in Nietzsche’s person. Therefore, his person is no less important than his thinking. De Graaff regards Nietzsche’s physical and mental sufferings as an embodiment of the downfall of Western culture. By means of Vornehmheit, nobility, Nietzsche held on to the bond with the sacred. After Nietzsche’s death there was no longer any hope for our culture. For a correct understanding of Nietzsche, it is very important to grasp what he means by nihilism (Chapter 2). According to Nietzsche, nihilism has Greek and Christian roots. Nihilism condemns and despises life. This is mainly due to the introduction of higher values by Christianity. In the light of these higher values, life loses its lustre and becomes essentially worthless. Nietzsche designates actual being as a being of no worth. This nihilism perverts existence. It is a power: a desire for the nothing. This power keeps operating until it ruins itself.
This is the moment that man overcomes his resentment and there is a turnaround. Now, the new reality becomes visible and new values arise. These are values derived from life itself. This is the real and final nihilism. Man did not know this new reality before. It brings along a new experience, which is, in fact, a religious experience. This is the experience of Dionysian reality.
Chapters 7 through 11 discuss nine authors: Barth, Miskotte, Küng, Jüngel, Vahanian, Robinson, Sölle, Altizer and Marion, and their relation to Nietzsche’s nihilism.
From a theological viewpoint, Barth and Miskotte have a lot in common. However, when it comes to how they assess the times in which they live, they go their own way. Barth’s consideration of the Nichtige, nothingness, is important because he sets the Nichtige over against Heidegger’s Nichts, the nothing, and Sartre’s Néant (Chapter 7; for Heidegger also see Chapter 2). In doing so, Barth has a distinctive contribution to the discussion about the fundamental cultural changes of his age. Barth regards the Nichtige as the ultimate evil. The Nichtige encapsulates the radical rejection of God’s mercy and election. But this radical evil has already been dismissed, rejected and defeated. This happened in creation, and, more radically, in the resurrection of Christ. On the one hand, Barth takes evil very seriously; on the other hand, he stresses that all forms of evil, including nihilism, have already been defeated. Barth is ambivalent towards his philosophical interlocutors.
Miskotte takes a different position (Chapter 8). With Barth, we get the impression that dogmatic stands previously taken prevent him from truly analysing his culture. In Miskotte’s case, the notion of religion plays a similar obstructing role. Miskotte still regards religion too much as a binding element of culture. With respect to the notion of religion, Miskotte, and Jüngel too, do not sufficiently recognize that with Nietzsche one can speak of a breach. Perhaps we should even speak of a paradigm shift. In any case, it is safe to say that an altered conception of reality plays an important role here. There is no coherence or overview anymore. Nor does religion provide a uniting, directive framework which gives a sense of purpose and by means of which man finds his bearings in life.
Küng’s approach to Nietzsche is remarkable (Chapter 9). Given the title of his book: Existiert Gott? one would expect the God-is-dead issue to get a lot of attention in the chapter about Nietzsche. That chapter, however, hardly deals with God’s death, but expressly with reality. Küng is of the opinion that the grounds for Nietzsche’s nihilism lie in the fact that he does not trust reality. With rational arguments, Küng wants to prove that reality is reliable, even though it appears to be otherwise. Nihilism is opposed in a rational way.
The heart of Jüngel’s refutation of Nietzsche’s nihilism lies in Christology (Chapter 9). The death of Christ on the cross is the death of God. This death is the most profound answer to nihilism, because, in His death, God took up the transitory reality as His own reality and thereby embedded the whole of reality in His own being. In that way, death, and nihilism too, have been defeated. Jüngel regards death as a manifestation of resistance against God and His mercy, but, as God assimilates this death, death shifts character and actually becomes a Gottesphänomen, a sign of God’s presence. God’s love is stronger than death.
Jüngel’s Christological focus can also be found in the work of Robinson and Sölle (Chapter 10). The death of a metaphysical God is no disaster. The radical theologians do not go into mourning because of God’s death. Especially with regard to Sölle, the death of a metaphysical God provides an opportunity to emphasize God’s solidarity with the world once more. The question, however, does remain as to the extent to which Robinson and Sölle still believe in God as a person, as a ‘Thou’. If Robinson and Sölle turn God into an immanent God, then what Vahanian calls the identification of God and man will happen and this will result in the death of both.
Altizer enters this discussion as a radical theologian, but he goes his own way (Chapter 10). His thinking is a systematic reasoning, which appears similar to Jüngel, because both theologians are strongly influenced by Hegel. Reality is a process in which God’s death works as a hinge point. Altizer develops a philosophical theology in which the discussion of God’s death is hardly significant, because it deals with a process regarding the whole of reality. The process moves between the poles of being and nothing, death and life, beginning and end. Altizer was not only influenced by Hegel, but also by Nietzsche. The desire for power is the hidden motive in Altizer’s philosophical theology. The desire for power also manifests itself when Altizer speaks of kenosis. As this desire for power is so overt, there is no room for suffering.
The essence of Marion’s analyses and conclusions is that Nietzsche has declared God’s death, but that he has done so within the framework of ontotheology (Chapter 11). This means that Nietzsche has not defeated metaphysics. Nietzsche kept thinking of God within an ontological pattern. To Marion, this means that Nietzsche could not speak of God except as an idol. An idol is a god who is brought up within this reality’s framework of being. Speaking of God in this manner is foreign to the biblical revelation. Marion wants to speak about God as an icon in a manner in which the notion of distance is essential. At this distance God remains out of range for man and God can be spoken of as God.
Marion demonstrates that Nietzsche’s thinking is formed by the Christic structure. The ‘Christ event’ overshadows everything. This structure of Nietzsche’s thinking proves that he is constantly taking account of the Christian faith and is informed by the God of the Bible.
After a thematic in-depth exploration of the central concepts in Chapter 13, I come to my concluding remarks in Chapter 14. The hinge in Nietzsche’s thinking lies in the fact that God’s death does not mean the disappearance, denial or absence of God, but the defeat of God. Since the cross and God are inseparable from a Christian perspective, Nietzsche’s God-is-dead proclamation is also aimed against the cross. When Nietzsche looks at the cross he sees God hanging there.
The cross brings about a change. According to Nietzsche, God’s weakness makes the weak human feel stronger. He feels divine, because God is with him through suffering and weakness. This is the reason why the confession that God hangs on the cross is so threatening. Jesus on the cross is still acceptable to Nietzsche. He regards the cross of Jesus as a confirmation of Jesus’ identity. But the meaning that Paul and the Early Church attach to the cross, namely that in Jesus God Himself suffered and died, is highly dangerous for him. Sooner or later it will lead to a revolution: the slave rebellion.
The death on the cross has therefore – paradoxically – not been the death of God. On the contrary, God could show his vitality precisely because of this slave rebellion. The cross has been the resurrection of God. For faith in God has given Europe and the whole world a change of complexion. Still, now, in the days of Nietzsche, God’s end has come. Christian values have been unmasked by the reality of life. Reality has taken revenge on (Christian) truth. The Christian faith has now been eroded; it is hollow. The time has come to kill this God. In the aphorism ‘Der tolle Mensch’ the exclamation ‘God is dead’ is what it is all about. It is about the fact of God’s death. At the same time, it is striking that the one who proclaims the death of God, also claims to be looking for God. This ambivalence is typical of the way that Nietzsche’s writes about death of God.
From ‘Das Eselsfest’, the Ass Festival, we learn that he who wants to kill most thoroughly, has to do so while laughing. The killing must be a joyful killing. This passage says that God’s murderer has resurrected God. Killing and resurrecting are strangely intertwined. Killing and resurrecting are actually the same. The sacred laughing defeats resentment, so that man can defeat himself and kill God. In a parodied manner, God and Christ may and must take up a lasting place within our culture, because this will help to achieve two goals: the death of God and the defeat of man.
The final conclusion is that the heart of Nietzsche’s nihilism holds that the death of God is a continual killing of God through parody. Parody is so important, because it allows one to finally take leave of God and Christ without any resentment. Faith after Nietzsche signifies believing with a certain sensitivity and alertness, as we find in Philippians 1: 9 and 10: Having the knowledge of discernment in view of the day of Christ.
Believing has been the same throughout history: breaking the immanent reality. Whether this reality is controlled by gods, ideas or concepts does not really matter. Reality remains a closed, immanent reality. However, God breaks the oppression of immanence. He liberates. Man is not alone with himself and he is not caught in a reality in which he hears the echo of his own voice. By speaking, God breaks the cosmic silence and makes room for the future.
Post-modern thinking has put an end to the big stories, including the big story of the Enlightenment. The great project of progress, moral improvement and an ideal future has failed. Postmodernity has had a sobering effect. Immanence has not been broken by it, but rather confirmed.
Philosophy and science make immanentism inescapable and give it a status of inviolability. However, in my opinion, this inescapability and inviolability constitute a religious enclosure. Despite many post-modern philosophies and theologies, and despite programmes of destruction, immanence has remained out of range. This points to a hidden religious Anliegen, concern, of our nihilist culture. In my opinion, the real task of theology after Nietzsche lies in its exposure.
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