Euthyphro by Plato

The Euthyphro is a paradigmatic early dialogue of Plato's: it is brief, deals with a question in ethics, consists of a conversation between Socrates and one other person who claims to be an expert in a certain field of ethics, and ends inconclusively. It is also riddled with Socratic irony: Socrates poses as the ignorant student hoping to learn from a supposed expert, when in fact he shows Euthyphro to be the ignorant one who knows nothing about the subject (holiness).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the dialogue is the inconclusiveness with which it ends. This inconclusiveness is hardly unique to the Euthyphro, but it is worth investigating. Is Plato suggesting that there is no such thing as a definition of holiness, that there is no one feature that all holy deeds have in common? And if he does think that there is a common link, why does he not reveal it to us in the dialogue?

We may link the inconclusiveness of the dialogue to the dialogue form itself and the irony Socrates employs. Plato's main goal is to teach us, and he believes firmly (as we gather in other dialogues, notably the Meno) that knowledge only comes when we are able to justify and account for our true beliefs. Thus, teaching is not simply a matter of giving the right answers. It is a matter of leading the student toward the right answers and ensuring that the student can explain and justify the answers rather than simply repeat them. The dialogue form is ideal for this kind of teaching; it shows Socrates leading Euthyphro through Euthyphro's own reasoning, and thereby letting Euthyphro sort things out for himself.

The irony is present because Socrates is treating Euthyphro as the teacher when in fact Socrates is teaching Euthyphro. This setup is necessary in order to encourage Euthyphro to present and analyze his own arguments, and thus to lead him to see their faults for himself. The dialogue ends inconclusively perhaps in order to urge the reader to think independently and struggle to formulate an adequate definition without Plato's help.

There is some suggestion that Euthyphro is not thinking along the right lines at all. The definition that Euthyphro holds equates what is holy with what is approved of by the gods. Socrates' skillful argument shows that this definition is insufficient: though what is holy may be approved of by the gods, the two cannot be the same thing. If the gods approve of something because it is holy, then their approval cannot be what makes it holy. Alternatively, if it is holy because the gods approve of it, then we still don't know for what reason the gods approve of it. It seems that any attempt to ground our definition of holiness in the will or approval of the gods is bound to fail. We might normally associate holiness with some sort of divine will, but Plato seems to be suggesting that we should think along another line altogether.

Perhaps this other line is the Theory of Forms (discussed in the Phaedo), which would posit the Form of Holiness as the defining characteristic of all holy things. There are hints toward this position in the dialogue, though it is highly unlikely that Plato had developed any kind of technical theory by the time the Euthyphro was written. Perhaps the absence of this formulated theory is what leads the dialogue to end inconclusively.

This prelude is loaded with the Socratic irony that is characteristic of an early Platonic dialogue. These early dialogues normally take place between Socrates and one other person, who claims to be an expert with regard to some field of knowledge or other, usually related to virtue. Socrates then confesses his own ignorance, asking his interlocutor to teach him. Slowly, through questioning, Socrates brings out the truth--that his interlocutor is in fact totally ignorant regarding this field. The irony lies in Socrates' manner of wholeheartedly accepting his interlocutor's word that he is indeed an expert. Here, for instance, we see Socrates suggesting that Euthyphro must be an expert with regard to what is holy and what is unholy, or else he would never dare prosecute his father. Euthyphro assures Socrates that he is indeed an expert, though we shall soon see that Euthyphro does not know how to define what is holy at all. Socrates' expressed confidence in Euthyphro's knowledge stands in ironic contrast to what we (and presumably Socrates) really think: that Euthyphro's decision to prosecute his own father is a sign of dogmatic narrow- mindedness, not evidence of his expert knowledge.

We also find Socratic irony, as well as a distinct touch of bitterness, in the brief mention of Meletus. Meletus (who is more prominent in The Apology) was the person primarily responsible for bringing Socrates to trial, and thus responsible for his subsequent death. One of his principal charges is that Socrates corrupts the youth of Athens, and Socrates here suggests that it is a noble pursuit to prosecute those who corrupt the youth. After all, he remarks, the improvement of the youth is of great importance. This is a standard Socratic belief: most of Socrates' followers--Plato included--were young men who were eager to learn. In displaying the ignorance of others, Socrates hoped to teach these youths how to reason more carefully and more modestly. Since, according to Socrates, knowledge is the greatest good, his teachings were of great benefit to his students. Socrates then gives his conviction that one should strive to improve the youth--an ironic twist, suggesting that Meletus should be lauded for pursuing the same goal. We are supposed to infer, of course, that if Meletus were indeed acting for the benefit of the youth, his cause should be lauded, but in fact he is doing quite the contrary: he is trying to put an end to Socrates' influence.

The Euthyphro was written not long after Socrates' execution, and so we should not be surprised that Meletus is presented in a bad light. Plato has good reason to be bitter toward this man, and refers dismissively to him as a "young unknown," befo re giving a very unflattering description of his physical features. In connection to Meletus' role in Socrates' execution, we should also note Euthyphro's prediction that all should end well for Socrates in this trial. There is a further touch of irony here, as Euthyphro--who claims to be an expert on matters divine and can predict the future--clearly does not foresee the actual, tragic outcome of Socrates' trial, an early sign that he may not be the expert on divine matters that he thinks he is.

The "divine sign" that Euthyphro alludes to is mentioned also in The Apology at 31c-d and 40a. Socrates explains it is a little voice in his head that often warns him not to do things that could be of great danger to him. That, for instance, is why he has always stayed away from politics, having been warned by his divine sign that he would meet with trouble.