Dialogues on women; images of women in the history of philosophy

L.D. Derksen

ISBN 9053834605

I have described various images of women and ideas concerning roles for women as they are presented by some of the main thinkers in the history of philosophy. For me, the most surprising result of this research is the fact that so much of what has been said about women in the philosophical tradition is "the same". By "the same" I mean that philosophers, when speaking about women, leave no cliché unturned. Women are seen as less rational than men, belong in the home, and are to be excluded from the public and intellectuallife of society. The female is seen as functioning within and symbolically representing the cyclical, naturalorder, the male as standing for and achieving things in the historical, cultural order. With respect to the male order, that of the female is inferior. The Pythagorean women, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Rousseau, Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are all to some extent of this opinion. Plato is the only philosopher on this list who wanted to break out of this pattern, but as we saw, his efforts are at best ambiguous.

Some of the other philosophers discussed, Christine de Pizan, Descartes, and Mary Wollstonecraft, have in common a desire to increase the scope of the concept of human nature and to see women as equal to men and as being capable of achievements in the realms traditionally called male. Irigaray is perhaps in her own category, in that she wishes to reformulate the question of the relationship between a general concept of human nature and the valuation of the masculine and feminine by combining the notions of difference and equality.

As Plato and Aristotle already indicated, the main point around which the gender discussion revolves concerns the view ofthe nature of women and their role in society. Are men and women "naturally" "the same" or are they "different"? If men and women can be seen as having their own "natural" characteristics, what does that say about their roles in society? Should men and women have different/unequal or the same/equal social status and roles? Should we follow Irigaray's suggestion that there be a positive appreciation in society of femininity as "different"? Or should we see male and female as different from each other but at the same time as having "equal" human and social rights in a political and legal sense? Or should we make use ofother theoretical models to express the relationship between the two genders? For example, a promising area might be that ofthe study ofthe social and political aspects of modern pluralism in philosophy and anthropology. Could we describe male and female as different "cultures" which should be treated in light of an ethics of pluralism?

Underlying these questions is another question. How can we separate our viewsofmale and female nature from the socialisation processes in which such views take shape? And perhaps the deepest question is: why do humans make so many distinctions and judgments concerning the ideology of gender in the first place?

In this concluding chapter, I would like to discuss the nature-culture distinction as it applies to the creation of male-female images and give the beginning of an answer to the question of why humans make ideological distinctions between males and females.

Nature, Culture and Society

Traditionally, there are rwo possible approaches to answering questions about how human beings come to be the way they are. One can take a historical-cultural point of view, seeing human beings as formed by socialisation processes and analysing the valuation and exclusion of individuals in cultural contexts. One can also take nature as the point of departure, searching for the reasons for the way we are in human nature, biology and instincts. In this book, dealing as it does with the history of ideas, cultural aspects ofthe valuation ofthe male and female have been discussed. Yet, as we also saw in this book, the concept of human nature, male and female nature, is very important to philosophers because "nature" can function as a foundation and therefore as a justification for certain "cultural" views. To some extent, all the philosophers we have discussed revert to a notion of human nature as underlying speaking about male and female on a cultural level. The appeal to a foundation in nature for cultural conclusions is expressed most clearly by Aristotle. For him, a social order is a "correct" order when it reflects the natural characteristics of those participating in it.

For Plato, there is a link between natural characteristics and social roles, but in a weaker sense than for Aristotle. As Plato states in the Republic, it is at least theoretically possible to reconsider ideas concerning the nature of people, a process which implies the possibility of a reconsideration of the existing social order. Conservative thinkers such as Aristotle tend to put more emphasis on human nature and natural characteristics in order to strengthen their presuppositions about male and female. Thinkers such as Plato who are open to alternative ideas and the possibility of change in the way society operates will argue that "natural" characteristics may be sodally coloured and hence subject to reinterpretation in different social contexts.

I think that we can draw two conclusions from the nature-culture discussions we have encountered in this book. Firstly, nature and culture are both important factors in forming people. Through socialisation, we become human, that is,we develop the capadty to experience human feelings, to respond to people and situations in typically human ways, to reason and use language to express ourselves about ourselves and the world: all attitudes and responses which are only possible because of the fact that other humans have taught us to use reason and language. Secondly, we can conclude that socialisation is only possible because humans have specific abilities, biological "givens". These "givens" can vary from person to person and between the genders, but this does not make them less necessary conditions for the possibility of human society.

All the philosophers discussed in this book agree that male and female are by nature human beings and that our shared humanity is"the basis on which relationships between the genders are built. I wish to point to this fact because I sometimes encounter statements to the effect that there are philosophers in the mainstream of the history ofwestern philosophy who deny that women have rationality, souls, or humanity. This is a misunderstanding caused by reading philosophers on the wrong level. Philosophers often do claim that women are less rational and hence less "human" than men, but this distinction is not made on the fundamental plane of rationality, soul and humanity but on the secondary level of gender spedfic characteristics.

Gender Typing

I think that the most promising of present day attempts to answer questions concerning the patterns which occur in the creation ofimages of men and women, the nature-culture discussion, and the roles men and women are to have in society is the theory that people "gender type" themselves.I By "gender typing" is meant that people have a basic need to identify with a certain gender and this is done by describing and prescribing sexual roles, characteristics and ideals. The aim is to form sexual-social identity. Sexuality in this view is something which is not just given, but which is constantly expressed and reinforeed in individual lives and in culture.

The main categories in which people place gender types are "male" and "female" for gender and "heterosexual" and "homosexual" for sexual orientation. Both categories are crude types because they may in fact be hopelessly inadequate for describing the wide variations which can occur in human gender identity and sexuality. What is interesting is that people want to believe that these categories apply and that they think that it is somehow important to dassify human beings in this way. In gend.er typing, people create "ideal types" which are dear and easy to apply, aiding them in categorizing people and making their social-sexual world ordered and manageable. People attribute certain values and ideals to these types: a man who sees himself as fitting in the ideal category "male" feels he must live up to certain male images and he becomes convineed that he cannot then say that he would be just as weIl off with female ones. The perception of the value (a perception which can slide into a feeling ofsuperiority) of one's own type is precisely the function of the exemplary nature of such images in the first place.

Gender typing can occur between men and women in order to identify a sexual mate as suitable and it can also occur in within groups of males or females themselves. People are evaluated within their own type on the basis ofhow "rnasculine" or "feminine" they seem to other members of the type. Gender typing can be used by a certain gender to make distinctions between people of that gender and certain typologies are presented to the other gender as attractive. The other gender in turn enforces, influences or changes the perception ofwhat the ideal characteristics of the opposite sex are. Looking at this phenomenon from out of an evolutionary, sexual selection point of view, it means rhat men and women compete within their type and select outside of their type in such a way that certain characteristics ofeach gender are selected and passed on to the next generation.

Gender typing also plays a role in social-sexual development. Freud pointed out the importance of gender typing in the Oedipus and Electra phases of sexual development. Freud concentrated primarily on the pivotal nature ofthe first origins ofsexual identification during what he calls the prehistorical phase in the life of a child, that is, the first three years of life.' At that age, the child' s sexual orientation is developed through a complex reaction to its male and female role models, usually parents. In later variations on the Freudian theory of gender typing, created by his followers, the entire lifespan ofpeople is seen as a process of sexual identification. In addition, Freud also pointed out that there are intellectual and cultural manifestations of gender typing which emerge through the process of sublimation. Culture can then be seen as both formed by sexual identification processesand in turn reinforcing the sexual identity of people.

If one wishes to account for differences in male-female nature and social roles in terms ofthe valuation ofone' s own type and the exclusion or downpiaying of other types, the question remains as to what makes this process so incredibly powerful. Male-female cultural patterns and sex/gender taboos are so strong that they can be maintained over millennia. We often assume that ifthe creation and maintaining ofsuch patterns is due to "nature" it means that the patterns are very set and difficult to change. But if we conclude that an important carrier of gender typing is culture, this means that culture, based on the expression of very fundamental human tendencies, is also extremely difficult to change. Perhaps culture, being so interdependent on nature is changed differently from the way nature changes but is equally difficult to change.

Feminism can be seen as an effort to alter gender typing rules and procedures. As we saw, Christine de Pizan, Mary Wollstonecraft and Luce Irigaray keep askingwhywomen have been characterised in certain ways and excluded from certain realms. Feminists ask over and over again "why are women typed the way they are"?What enabled men to create certain ideologies about themselves and about women and why did women never manage to break through the exclusionary forces of the male system? As Simone de Beauvoir wonders, are there not two guilty parties, the men who created these images and the women who also created them and accepted them"

Women have the distinct feeling that a number of characteristics which males appropriate to themselves (rationality or having careers, for example) are not specifically male characteristics at all and that male efforts to demonstrate thatwomen are not good at these things or should not be participating in such activities at all are offensive. Feminists therefore wish to change the rules for typing male and female nature and social roles. But, assuming that despite the great strength of traditional typologies it is possible to change them, what criteria are there for such change? This is the issue with which society and feminism is now being faced.

Science and the Social Good

Who can and should how gender is to be typed and on what basisshould such decisions be made? Men, women, science or the social-political agenda concerned with "the social good"? Women often claim that men haveslways been the ones who decided these matters and that this is not right or fair. Women themselves should have more ofa voice in the gender typing process, a task many have taken on in western society. Is philosophy an area in which theories should be developed to support this effort or are we better offlooking to other fields to arrive at answers? I will first look at two non-philosophical areas in which people [ook for answers to these questions and will then look at the efforts made in contemporary philosophy to analyse and promote the cause ofwomen.

Are there scientifically "objective" criteria to settle the disputes? Perhaps scientific research could give neutral answers to what fits in best with male and female nature and what social-political role divisions would create a more perfect society? At the moment, a great amount of scientific research is being done in order to find factual answers to questions concerning male and female nature. Because of the complexity of the matter, science has not yet come to the point where it can give definitive answers.

It seems to me that the only general message coming out ofscientific research is that a certain percentage ofour make-up is different in male and female, a certain percentage the same. This is the case on both a genetic, biologicallevel as well as on asocial, intellectuallevel. Biologically, female and male are variations on one fundamental genetic pattern. Anthropological intercultural surveys have shown that males and females in widely varying cultures will show similar behavioural patterns and preferences but will differ in some respects due to cultural norms. Studies in cognitive theory and neurophysiology on the functioning of the brains of males and females show that males and females may make different use of some parts of their brains, accounting for phenomena such as the fact that males seem to be better in rnath, females in languages. On the other hand, not all males are better in math or worse in languages than all females and vice versa. It has also been shown that in different circumstances, for example, if males receive more attention with respect to language skills at school and females with math, the differences in test results also become smaller. These results would seem to confirm that there are no absolute differences between males and females and that influences on the functioning of the two genders is part nature, part culture.

Since research into areas such as biology, anthropology, cognitive theory and brain physiology apparently cannot at this time create firm theories to explain and predict the differences in the functioning ofmen and women, such research, when applied to everyday life, does not seem to be able to take us beyond the commonly held perception that describing gender differences takes us into a murky, grey area of sameness and difference. Perhaps what we need is a less scientific and more general and pragmatic means of distinguishing images and roles of men and women: we could look for criteria on a social-political-level.

One could attempt to take one's point of departure in the concrete results ofrecent changes in gender roles in western culture and to project from that what the best way is to organise male and female roles in society in the future. But here too, we lack helpful answers. Our society is faced at present with a broad social agenda formulated by those who would like to give concrete expression to the notion of women's liberation. Some ofthe items on this agenda are: altering perceptions of social roles, having men care for children and the home, seeing to it that women are as well educated and as prepared for society as possible, helping women who get into difficulties with the male social and political order, and working on making society aware of damaging patterns of behaviour of males towards females. The problem with analysing this social agenda is that it does not form one coherent whole, Some of these initiatives serve to maintain traditional structures and serve the needs of women, for example, increased awareness of and proteetion against spousal abuse. Other points on the social agenda concern matters such as equal job opportunities, equal pay, and positive action to help women catch up with men in the workplace. It seems to me that pragmatism and responding to the needs ofwomen governs the "progressive" social agenda, rather than abstract theories. This is of course a very good thing because it means that women are getting the practical support which they need. For theory formation, however, it becomes quite a muddie for someone looking for dear theories to determine what the leading ideas of such social reform are.

Another difficulty with using the present liberating social agenda to create guidelines for the future is that it is difficult to estimate what the impact is of the changes being made or their consequences for society and male-female relationships. Views on this differ widely. Some say that liberating women will mean the downfall ofvalues, the family, and society. This seems to me an overly pessimistic view. Moreover, it is one-sided in the sense that it blames many social ills on the changing roles ef.morhers in the family while ignoring other factors which may lead to malaise in a society, induding matters such as the economie situation of a country, job opportunities, dedining values, and generations of absent fathers. Others say the impact ofwomen's liberation is not positive because in the end it will have only minimal results. Of those who say that, the most pessimistic view is that we need po do a great deal more to ensure that the process of the liberation ofwomen is not bogged down or even turned back in ever changing social conditions and perceptions. Betty Friedan, for example, in her book The Second Stage warns against being overly optimistic about the achievements of the women's movement. She argues against optimism by referring to the historicallesson ofthe dedine ofthe first feminist movement in the early years of our century, when women gained the right to vote. After that right was won, the women's movement dedined, only being revived in the 1960's because of new social conditions in western countries."

In the 1990's, Friedan's warning seems apt. There seems to be quite an onslaught on the women's movement at present. Outside the movement, a new image battle seems to have arisen, one which can be called in gender typing terminology "reverting to type". If gender typing depends on the creation of clear and stabie types, as has been argued, there will be astrong tendency to reject complex variations on the type and to revert to old types. (This is the case not only in male-female typing but also in the related area mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that of ethnicity). The result of this reversion is that feminists are once more being depicted as unattractive and out ofdate and/or that the people who were never convineed by feminism in the first place can now openly make this claim. Inaddition, the old strategy of"divide and conquer" has re-emerged. Women are being divided once more by the promise of equal opportunities and careers for those women who conform to increasingly conservative standards. Feminists have also been remorselessly attacked with the new catch phrase of the 90's, "political correctness". Under this label, feminism has been identified with petty tyrrany arising from the desire to promote the interests of a minority; of reacting in an unreasonable way to the standards set up by a presumably reasonable, intelligent and tolerant society; and in its most extreme form, the political correctness attack takes the self-pitying form of a clearly powerful majority claiming to be themselves repressed by feminism. These tendencies are, moreover, not harmless rhetoric: the recent revoking of legislation concerning positive action in various states of the USA is a grim reminder to women and minorities that their social-political power is limited and hence that their tights can easily be taken away.

Besides the battle for ideas, images, and the future ofsociety, women are (rightly or wrongly) internalising the social problems of our tjrne and culture. The crumbling of social structures and of traditional morality in many western countries has led to neo-Conservative movements promising redemption in traditional family values and calling on women to uphold these values. Since women are once more being held responsible for the family and blamed for its failures, this places a burden on the feminist conscience. In addition, women themselves have have turned inward to reconsider their attitude towards family values for a practical reason: being faced with the toll on themselves of combining raising a family with a career.

These developments must surely serve as a warning that a lot still needs to be done to ensure that women have the freedom to determine their own livesand fate. We must once more be cautious about thinking that the bartles for equal opportunities and equality have been won. At the same time, the criticisms which have been made of feminism and the practical difficulties resulting from some points on the feminist agenda have served to moderate the movement. In our time, there is a growing awareness on the part offeminism that there are no guarantees that the course people set out to attain matters such as freedom and equality will be the best course: women can only fight for what they think is best. In the 1990's, the realisation has grown that there is no gender utopia and no easy answers to be found by looking at the present social situation.

The Task of Philosophy

In this climate, what can philosophy mean for the women's movement? The discussion ofthe history ofviews ofphilosophers on women in this book may help to analyse what some of the problems are in the way men and women see each other and in the way they assign roles to each other. In this sense, this book can be regarded as a consciousness raising session. But what can philosophy mean for the women's movement in the rnture? Can philosophy tell us whether the issues discussed in this book will always be with us or if they can be resolved through social change? Can it shed light on the question ofwhetherwomen will remain for a long time to come in the present limbo between traditional roles and liberation from them?

Philosophy can contribute to the women's movement by analyzing theoretically what is going on in society and in those areas in which academie research on women is being done. Besides taking up the role of diagnostician, the philosopher can also attempt to develop theorieson women within all the various philosophical fields. Perhaps the most worthwhile and challenging task for philosophers is the creation of a philosophical ethics of how to see women and their roles in society. Philosophers on the whole have felt so threatened by the women's movement that they have failed to understand that the primary impulse ofthis movement is an ethical one. In this sense, the women's movement is part of the more general social tendeney to realise ethical ideals by fighting for specific causes. Examples of this tendency is the support people give to Amnesty International, the environmental movement, and the development of the third world.'

Can philosophy aid both society and the women's movement by developing an "ethics of sexual difference", to quote Irigaray? Philosophy cannot and may not teU people what to do, but because of its theoretical strength, it can aid in clarifying ethical positions and formulating which values would fit into a consistent pattern and argue for the importance of having certain values. In the present philosophical debate, two positions are already crystalizing. One is the choice for traditional liberal values such as freedom of speech, respect for others, and the freedom of self-expression and self-fulfiUment, free from domination. Another option is to argue for an ethics of compassion, concern and care, an ethics ofself-sacrifice,which can form the basis for male-female relationships as weU as the attitude of people to others in society.

There are, however, a number ofdrawbacks to such a project. In the first place, philosophy has, as Hegel pointed out, the woeful fate of alwayscoming into action after the event. Whether philosophical-theoretical purists like it or not, society and interest groups inside it are already diagnosing problems and making decisions to solve them. This is of course a good thing because society cannot wait for philosophy to come up with solutions. Besides, the fact that philosophy comes after the eventean be an advantage because it can then place practise in the context of theory. A second difficulty is that the male philosophical establishment is not very interested in supporting the development of an ethics of sexual difference because it is seen as something women should develop in their own philosophical sub-class and which only applies to them. Men have the tendency to apply themselves to these matters only when they feel that there is either status at stake or a crisis which needs their attention. In all other cases, women are seen as responsible for theory formation on women, the family, and the role of women in society. Lastly, another barrier to overcome is to create a philosophy which applies to all women, not only a small number of well-educated middle class western women. Is it possible to create a philosophical ethics of sexual difference which would transeend these boundaries?

The task of philosophy in theoretically supporting and furthering the women's movement is, luckily, not something which has to begin from point zero. It has been argued that the most revolutionary, pervasive movement for change in western society in the latter part of the 20th century has been the women's movement. This movement can provide philosophers with a vast resource of new theoretical concepts. The task of philosophy is to take up these concepts and to make something of them which will provide society with asolid theoretical basis for its decisions on male and female.

Women today owe much to the wornen's movement, whether they regard themselves as part of that movement or not. The women's movement has been a great ethical accomplishment because it has succeeded in identifying and to some extent taking down the barriers that have been put up for women in the public realm. It is also responsible for the creation ofmore positive self-imagesofwomen. Men have learned to accept women as more equal to them than in the past and hopefully will continue to make progress in this area. Women can rightly be proud of having brought about these changes, for many of them have been due to their own efforts, hard fought for by women for themselves and for other women.

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Understanding Music’s Theological Significance: A Kantian Approach

JIRTLE, JAMES, VERNON 

Jeremy Begbie speaks of music as ‘theologically loaded’: as conveying a sense of intrinsic theological significance. This thesis explores the possibility that music is theologically loaded in an epistemological sense: that music is dependent on knowledge of God. Modern epistemologies, in which knowledge is constructed by the individual human mind, pose a challenge to such a conclusion, since even if divine knowledge is possible it would appear irrelevant for our understanding of objects, such as music, that can be known directly through experience. Because Immanuel Kant presents a particularly stringent theory of human-mind-dependent knowledge, we can use his aesthetic theory as an analytical tool both to assess the epistemological content of our aesthetic judgements as they relate to musical beauty, and to consider whether theological knowledge can be relevant to these judgements.

Applying Kant’s aesthetic theory to musical beauty, we find that from within, music seems sublime — defying our ability to understand its form or predict its structure — while from without it remains clearly intelligible. This unique construction makes our judgements of musical beauty particularly dependent on what Kant calls a ‘common sense’: a principle that, although outside our cognition, nevertheless plays a constitutive role in our aesthetic judgements by ensuring their universal validity. The dependence of our aesthetic judgements on this common sense allows for the possibility that musical beauty is dependent on knowledge of God — even when considered within a human-mind-dependent epistemology — and thus enables us to give an account of music’s theological significance that is consistent with modern theories of knowledge. Considered within a Christian perspective, this common sense forms the basis for a grammatical understanding of beauty, in which beauty represents the distance between our awareness of divine providence and our limited knowledge of God’s purposes.

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Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason by Immanuel Kant

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion, hereafter) is a passionate statement of Kant's mature philosophy of religion. As the title suggests, Kant believes that religious experience is best understood through rationalism, an important philosophical movement in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries that argues we know some things intuitively, not through experience, and that we can determine certain absolute truths by relying on this intuitive knowledge.

In Religion, Kant explores the legitimacy of religious experience. He argues that organized religion often gets in the way of genuine religious experience, thereby threatening the moral development of humanity. This argument spans four sections.

In Part One, Kant discusses whether human nature is inherently evil or inherently good. He thinks we have a predisposition to engage in good behavior, which comes in three instinctual urges: propagating the species, fostering meaningful, stable relationships with others, and respecting the moral law. Kant thinks that in addition to our inclination to be good, we have a simultaneous propensity for evil or immoral behavior. Kant suggests that we will see the truth of his thesis if we examine the evil abroad in the world around us. The state of current political and social life will convince skeptics that people are in need of moral development.

In Part Two, Kant argues that it is possible for us to become morally good by following the example of Jesus Christ, who resisted enticing temptations, and by instituting a wholehearted change in behavior.

In Part Three, Kant says it may be possible to create a society that fosters moral behavior. Such a society would emulate the ideal "church invisible," an association of individuals committed to living morally upright lives. Kant says that rituals and professions of faith are not essential for the establishment of a morally sound religious community. We can know our duty to observe the moral law without the aid of miracles or common religious practices.

In Part Four, Kant continues to criticize certain aspects of organized religion. He says that much of existing organized religion does not help people improve their moral standing. Incantations, professions of faith, and even consistent participation in religious services cannot transform the morally corrupt into the morally upright.

***

Philosophers since Kant have quarreled with two main problems that arise in this section. First, one might wonder why maxims—the rules that human beings formulate internally when they make choices—have to be either good or bad, rather than both at the same time. Second, one might question Kant's assertion that any action not performed wholly from a sense of duty is evil.

Kant says that maxims cannot encompass both good and bad desires. He believes that every desire that we face, every impulse that competes for our ratification, falls into one of two categories: run-of-the-mill, everyday desires, or the desire to fulfill your duty and do what the moral law requires. He says we can only be good if we do what duty calls for, and when we act on everyday desires and impulses, as we often do, we are acting immorally.

Kant excludes the possibility that maxims can include more than one desire or impulse. Professional philosophers have struggled with this issue, and most of them either admit Kant's belief that maxims are only motivated by one desire, or insist that maxims can, strictly speaking, include more than one desire or inclination. The latter theory appears to be more consistent with Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. For instance, Kant says in 6:24 that free action not based on the moral law must be based upon an everyday desire, and that "it follows that his disposition as regards the moral law is never indifferent (never neither good nor bad)." This quotation shows Kant's idea that an everyday desire and duty can be unified in one maxim, although the resulting behavior must be considered evil, not good.

This brings us to the second problem: why do maxims forged from a combination of duty and everyday desire have to be considered evil? Again, philosophers have given two responses. Some have said that actions done from both duty and desire are not necessarily evil, but rather lack (in Kantian terminology) full moral worth. This response assumes that passages where Kant describes as evil actions motivated by duty and desire are merely exaggerations. Yet some philosophers have said that Kant did mean to call such behavior evil.

Kant might mean to stress that our predisposition to evil is the real problem, not the moral worth of the actions themselves. In 6:30, Kant says that humans have an overwhelming tendency to engage in immoral behavior, and "the mind's attitude is thereby corrupted at its root, and hence the human being is designated as evil".

Kant regards Christianity as the preliminary step in developing a truly moral religion. If Christianity will change, or even vanish, to be replaced by moral religion, what will become of the faith Christians have in Jesus? Kant does not clarify whether people will always need to believe that Jesus truly existed on this earth as a perfect man, as God's human representative, or whether eventually people will be satisfied with striving to emulate an abstract, nonexistent perfect person. Kant does think that role models are important for human beings, which might suggest a belief that people will continue to believe in Jesus. However, he also seems hopeful that people will realize that their faith in Jesus is truly a faith in the ideal of moral perfection.

Kant believes the innate good in people will cause them to turn away from ecclesiastical faith and religious practices, and toward moral religion. He does not claim that people will convert to moral religion because it is simpler than traditional religions. In fact, moral religion is more demanding than ecclesiastical faith, for it requires every individual to take full responsibility for becoming a better person. Neither does Kant claim that people will turn to moral religion from a desire to unite all religious traditions. Kant does claim that Human nature naturally tends toward reforming itself, especially when moral insights are a matter of public discussion: "Truth and goodness (and in the natural predisposition of every human being there lies the basis both for insight into these and heartfelt sympathy for them) do not fail, once made public, to propagate everywhere, in virtue of their natural affinity with the moral predisposition of rational beings" (6:123). Here Kant says that once the advantages of moral religion are made public, the good in human beings will help them feel an affinity for moral religion. Moral religion is true to human nature itself. In Kant's narrative, good ultimately triumphs over evil, not because God's grace grants it (as Christian theology explains it), but because of human agency.

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant

Kant's philosophy has been called a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. From rationalism he takes the idea that we can have a priori knowledge of significant truths, but rejects the idea that we can have a priori metaphysical knowledge about the nature of things in themselves, God, or the soul. From empiricism he takes the idea that knowledge is essentially knowledge of experience, but rejects the idea that we cannot learn any necessary truths about experience, and in doing so he rejects Hume's skepticism.

He is able to create this synthesis largely thanks to a radical reconception of the nature of knowledge that comes from from experience. Though empiricists and rationalists may have disagreed about the value or certainty of knowledge from experience, they both generally thought of the mind as a neutral receptor: knowledge from experience was simply the report of the senses. Kant points out that our knowledge of experience extends far beyond what the senses can report. Our senses can report sensations, but they cannot give these sensations a structure in space and time, or organize them according to cause and effect. According to Kant, our faculties or sensibility and understanding are largely responsible for what we think of as "knowledge from experience."

By giving our mind this complex internal structure, Kant makes room for a great deal of a priori knowledge. Though the sensations that are the basis for all our experience come from things in themselves, any regularity or structure we find in these sensations comes from our mental concepts. Thus, while Kant does not slip into the idealist position of saying that reality is all a matter of perception, he does claim that the laws of nature are the laws of our mental faculties. For something to be an objective law, it must be synthetic and it must be a priori, and Kant identifies the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the structure of our mental faculties.

If our sense of order and regularity is not something we find in experience, but something we impose upon experience, the study of this order and regularity is a study of our own faculties rather than a study of experience. Kant reconceives the purpose of metaphysics as being one of critique: we must seek to understand how knowledge is structured, and consequently how the various concepts of our mental faculties are organized. This is an important step for philosophy: after Kant published his work, there was been less interest in making extravagant claims about the nature of the universe, and greater emphasis on determining what we can know and on what grounds we can claim to know it.

This kind of scrutiny, which Kant advocates, has led to some serious attacks on his work. The German Idealists—notably Hegel—were the first to call into question Kant's concept of the thing in itself. Kant insists that while all we can perceive are appearances, these appearances are caused by things in themselves that are outside the realm of experience. Because they are outside the realm of experience, they are also outside the realm of space and time and any of the regularities we perceive in nature. A number of questions can be raised about what kind of relation things in themselves can have with appearances if categories such as time, causation, and even existence do not apply to them. The response of the German Idealists was to abandon the concept of things in themselves and assert that only appearances exist.

Analytic philosophy also got its start by criticizing Kant. This movement criticized in particular his category of the synthetic a priori. Frege was the first to point out that geometry is not synthetic a priori. Pure geometry—which consists only of deductive inferences—is analytic, and empirical geometry—which deals with what space is like in the real world—is knowna posteriori. This position was given a boost by Einstein's relativity, which shows that space is very different from what we had assumed and our understanding of it is certainly not a priori.

Frege also complains that Kant's definition of analytic and synthetic judgments rests on the subject-predicate form of grammar, which is not a necessary part of the logical structure of language. Efforts to define and classify analytic and synthetic judgments have been a major pre-occupation of analytic philosophy, especially in the first half of the twentieth century.

Though many of Kant's doctrines have fallen into question, his exhortation toward critical philosophy remains with us. Perhaps his most lasting contribution is the setting up of a new standard for rigor and circumspection in philosophical investigations.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was met mostly with bewilderment when it was first published in 1781. The Prolegomena, published in 1783, was primarily intended to clarify and simplify what was said in the Critique in order to make it accessible. A second, largely revised, edition of the Critique was published in 1787.

Readers and reviewers generally failed to appreciate the originality of Kant's ideas. Readers interpreted Kant as saying something more familiar to them than what he was actually saying. The idea that rationalist metaphysics, which was the main occupation of philosophers in Germany at the time, could be dismissed entirely was too revolutionary a concept to catch on easily.

One of Kant's main troubles, it seems, was that he was taken for an idealist. Idealism is the doctrine that reality is dependent upon the mind. A common idealistic argument suggests that everything I know about the world I learn through the senses, and so the things I "know" are not external objects and phenomena, but just the report of my senses. My concept of the world, an idealist would argue, is based entirely on sensory images that exist only in my mind, and has at best a dubious connection with the things in themselves that exist in the world.

A famous proponent of this position is George Berkeley, an Irish bishop who argues that esse est percipi—"being is being perceived." He asserts that chairs and tables and the like have no independent existence, that they only exist in the mind of someone who is perceiving them. He evades the odd claim that these things cease to exist when no one is perceiving them by positing the existence of God as a being who is perpetually perceiving everything.

Kant's philosophy is very firm in asserting that we can know only about appearances, and that we can know nothing about things in themselves. This assertion is enough to make Kant an idealist of sorts, but he wants to qualify this title of "idealism." He is not, like Berkeley, saying that only appearances exist: though we can know nothing about things in themselves, they are still a crucial part of his philosophy.

Kant calls his philosophy "transcendental" or "critical" idealism. The "transcendent" world of things in themselves is contrasted with the "immanent" world of appearances. Because he believes that things in themselves exist, his idealism believes in the existence of a "transcendent" world that is behind the world of appearances.

His idealism is "critical" because it is directed toward what we can know, not toward what exists. He is not saying that only appearances exist, but that appearances are all we can know. Kant's critical philosophy questions how we can come to know what we know, so he is an idealist only in saying that we cannot know things in themselves.

The concept of the thing in itself is one of the most controversial aspects of Kant's philosophy. In Germany, Kant's successors—most notably Hegel—criticized this concept, and advanced a pure form of idealism that did away with things in themselves entirely. It is unclear what sort of relation things in themselves are supposed to bear to appearances if categories such as space, time, and causality do not apply to them. For instance, suppose we see Frank hit John, and then John hit Frank back, we must assume that these appearances are somehow related to things in themselves. But how can there be actions and reactions in things in themselves without the concept of time?

Because he says that they are unknowable, Kant cannot say anything about the nature of things in themselves, but his silence in this regard leaves us with a number of mystifying puzzles. How can appearances in space and time be related to things in themselves outside of space and time? Those who are dissatisfied with Kant generally identify their dissatisfaction with the unanswered questions raised by Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Idealists generally deny that things in themselves exist, and realists generally assert that categories like space and time have more than just a subjective existence.

Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant

It is difficult to overestimate Kant's influence in philosophy. Even those who reject his explicit theories often use his terms, whether by wondering how it could be possible for something to be "synthetic" (not a matter of meaning) and yet "a priori" (knowable independent of experience), or by asking what is the source of an ethical "imperative." Kant has sometimes been credited for almost single-handedly creating the German philosophical tradition, and it certainly is hard to imagine what Hegel's or Marx's wrings would have looked like without the influence of Kant.

Many current day writers on philosophical ethics have been influenced by Kant. Some accept the categorical imperative as a valid test of moral rightness, but more commonly one will see Kant's linking of morality and autonomy, or his analysis of moral worth as an inner acceptance of the motive of duty, or his insistence that the good is what the moral aims at as opposed to morality being defined by its aim at the good.

The impact of Kant's writing style has arguably also been extensive, on which topic the twentieth century philosophy Walter Kaufmann tartly reports, "Few philosophers since Kant have approximated his genius, but many of his shortcomings are widely shared even today, and to some extant at least this is due to his phenomenal influence." Kant's insights are often masked by his convoluted sentences and unclear technical terms. Fortunately, the second Critique is significantly more accessible than the first, but still the second Critique elicits many conflicting interpretations.

The Critique of Practical Reason can be regarded as the sequel to theCritique of Pure Reason, picking up where that earlier book left off. In the first Critique, Kant divides our judgments in two ways—the a priori (knowable before experience) versus the a posteriori (knowable through experience) and the analytic (true by virtue of meaning) versus the synthetic (true by virtue of the facts). He ultimately concludes, first, that a posteriori judgments are about how things look to us, not about how things intrinsically are, since they are filtered through our experiences, and, second, all synthetic judgments are a posteriori, since we have no access to the world other than through experience.

This second conclusion rules out the possibility of metaphysically proving the existence of God, freedom, and immortality. It does leave open, though, the right to have faith that such things exist in the way the world is in itself, the noumenal realm, since we can never know what is true in that realm. The second Critique will take this further, arguing that the correct understanding of morality requires us to believe in God, freedom, and immortality. As well as continuing from the Critique of Pure Reason, theCritique of Practical Reason lays the grounds for the Metaphysics of Morals,written nine years later in 1797, and which applies the general moral principles of the second Critique to a variety of cases.

The second Critique in some senses can be seen as the opposite of the first Critique. While the main theme of the first Critique is how little we can know about its topic, metaphysics, the second Critique is about how we can know about its topic, morality. Not only that, but some of the first Critique is arguably taken back. We are directly aware of the application of the moral law to us, and through this, we are aware of our freedom, which, it turns out, is awareness of causation from the noumenal world. More than that, not only can we believe in God and immortality, as the first Critique agreed, but it turns out that reason commands belief in them.

In a different sense, though, the second Critique furthers the work of the first. Kant describes himself in the Critique of Pure Reason as having created a revolution to counter Copernicus'. Copernicus humbles man by removing him form the center of the physical universe, but Kant elevates him by presenting the whole phenomenal world of the senses as being created by us and by our senses. In the conclusion of the second Critique, Kant picks up this metaphor again, explaining how he has now shown how the human being lies at the center of the moral universe, and through that universe man connects with the noumenal world.

Kant's comparison of the first and the second Critique in the preface and his subsequent discussion in the introduction bring out one of the oddities of Kant's writing: a tendency to model his works after one another. Here it is questionable whether the structure of the first Critique was really so suitable for this book, and whether the parallels he discusses are more illuminating or more distracting. The first Critique utilizes theoretical reasoning—roughly, philosophical thinking—to examine the limits of the potential achievements of such thinking. The second Critique, however, as Kant points out, does not use pure practical reason—decision-making based on reason and not on desire—to point out the limitations of such decision- making. For one thing, it is unclear how one could "apply" a faculty of decision-making in a book, which is better seen as a recording of theoretical reason's activity.

Mainly though, Kant is not critiquing pure practical reason but lauding it, saying that it is possible and that it is the ground of morality. True, we can say that he is thereby attacking impure practical reason. Kant believes that although his beliefs about pure practical reason are commonsensical, insofar as common sense can grasp them, philosophers are liable to go astray and enshrine the self-serving calculations of impure practical reason in the place of pure practical reason. But it remains to be seen whether anything is really gained by setting up the analogy in the first place.

A point about the comparison which is important to remember is that the Critique of Practical Reason does not simply contrast with the Critique of Pure Reason, in that it critiques the impure reason which the first Critique still left unexamined. Rather, the title of the first Critique is meant to be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason," while the title of the second Critique can be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Impure Practical Reason". The pure / impure distinction, which has to do with whether contingent, sensory factors are involved, is not the same as the theoretical / practical distinction, which has to do with the faculty of knowing versus the faculty of acting.

This book contains three sections: the Analytic, the Dialectic, and the Doctrine of Method. The Analytic presents, in both critiques, the operations of the faculty in question. In the case of the second Critique, this will turn out to be a derivation of the one principle of pure practical reason, the categorical imperative, and an argument that obeying it is equivalent to freedom. The Dialectic presents, in both Critiques, arguments that the faculty in question can go astray. In the case of the second Critique, this will be an argument that pure practical reason goes wrong when it seeks perfection in this world, as well as an argument that what we should instead do is seek perfection in the next world with God's help, making the assumption that immortality and God exist. The Doctrine of Method in the first Critique plans out the future sciences of pure theoretical reason; the Doctrine of Method in the second Critique plans out the future of educating people in the use of pure practical reason.

The Critique of Practical Reason contains the one true ultimate moral principle, the categorical imperative. However, there is no full discussion of its application. That is because Kant intends everything in the Critique of Pure Reason to proceed a priori, without any reference to what, as a matter of contingent fact, human nature happens to be like. Without such a theory, we cannot say what, concretely, our duties are. The role of the Metaphysics of Morals is to give such a theory.